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Special Masters in Bankruptcy:
The Case Against Bankruptcy Rule 9031
PauletteJ. Delk*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although American bankruptcy courts hear hundreds of individual,
partnership, and corporate bankruptcy cases every year involving complex
environmental, tax, tort, and contract issues, bankruptcy courts and the parties
before them may not benefit from the assistance of special masters. Rule 9031
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure' makes Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules ofCivil Procedure ("FRCP") 2 governing the appointment and duties of the
special master inapplicable in bankruptcy cases. While many courts and
commentators recognize that federal courts have inherent authority to appoint
special masters,3 bankruptcy courts have not relied upon this inherent power
freely in light of Rule 9031, which could be construed as so restricting the
bankruptcy court's authority to appoint special masters as to foreclose the
possibility ofrelying on any other power completely. In this Article, the Author
attempts to demonstrate that bankruptcy courts regularly hear cases in which the
court and the parties could benefit from the services of a special master and that
bankruptcy courts are hampered in their ability to handle cases in the most just
and efficient manner possible because of their inability to appoint special
masters. Part II of this Article examines the role of the special master in the
federal courts generally. It examines the scope of tasks traditionally performed
by special masters, as well as the expanded role that special masters have played
in recent years as the courts increasingly have relied on special masters in case
management. Part III examines the nature of complex bankruptcy cases and the
role that special masters could play in these cases. Part IV provides background

* Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, University of Memphis.
B.A., Fisk University 1967; M.S.W., Atlanta University 1969; J.D., DePaul University
1980.
1.FED. R. BANKR. P. 9031; see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
2. FED. R. CIv. P. 53.
3. See, e.g., Veneri v. Draper, 22 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1927); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 217-21 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Jordan v. Wolke,
75 F.R.D. 696,700-01 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Wayne D. Brazil, SpecialMasters in Complex
Cases: Extending the Judiciaryor ReshapingAdjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394,
415 n.80 (1986) [hereinafter Brazil, SpecialMasters];Margaret G. Farrell, Copingwith
Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927, 943 (1994)
[hereinafter Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence]; I.H. Jacob, The Inherent
Jurisdictionofthe Court,23 CURRENTLEGALPROBS. 23, 34 (1970); see infranotes 13143 and accompanying text.
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on the history and rationale for Rule 9031. Part V explores the roles of the
examiner and trustee in bankruptcy, and compares those roles with the role of the
special master. Part VI discusses the concept of the federal courts' inherent
authority to appoint persons to assist the court in performing specific, welldelineated judicial tasks in furtherance of the efficient administration of cases.
II. SPECIAL MASTERS IN FEDERAL COURTS GENERALLY

A. A BriefHistory
The practice of appointing special masters to provide assistance to courts
is a long and well-established one. Some historians believe that the practice of
appointing persons to assist the court, through a formal process, was first
established in early Roman law through the use of the judex-a private person
appointed by a praetor, with the consent of the parties to an action, to hear and
decide the case.4 Special masters were used in England at least as far back as the
seventeenth century (introduced in the British legal system by the Normans,
some historians believe), although the actual benefit to the court, and, especially
to the parties, was questionable at that time.' The practice of appointing special
masters to assist the court continued in America beginning at least as early as the
eighteenth century.6 Not long thereafter, the federal judiciary began to use

4. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.8(1), at 190 (2d ed. 1993); 1
WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 416 (A. Goodhart & H.
Hanbury eds., 7th ed. rev. 1956); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 193 (1959); 2 CHARLES P. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE

MODERN WORLD §§ 849,881, at 404,434(1937); James R. Bryant, The Office ofMaster
in Chancery: Early English Development, 40 A.B.A. J. 498, 498 (1954); see also
Simpson v. Canales, 806 S.W.2d 802, 806-11 (Tex. 1991) (reviewing the history of
special masters).
5. See generally I HOLDSWORTH, supranote 4, at 424-25 (describing generally the
abuses in the system); Irving R. Kaufman, Masters in the FederalCourts: Rule 53, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 452, 452 (1958) (citing 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 43
(Bowring ed., 1843); 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORYOF ENGLISH LAW 360 (3d

ed. 1944) (describing the masters' practice of delaying proceedings for the purpose of
charging a special fee for acceleration, and increasing the number of appearances before
the master and the number of services that the masters were required to perform to
increase fees); Linda J. Silberman, Masters andMagistratesPartI: The English Model,
50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1070, 1075-79 (1975) (describing the history of the special master
system in England)).
6. See James R. Bryant, The Office ofMaster in Chancery: ColonialDevelopment,
40 A.B.A. J. 595, 598 (1954) (describing the history and process of development of the
special master in colonial America); Linda J. Silberman, Masters and MagistratesPart
II: The American Analog, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1321-22 (1975) (noting that special
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/8
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special masters on a regular basis to handle discrete aspects of cases, such as
taking and reporting testimony,' determining questions at issue where facts and
evidence were complex and voluminous,8 and auditing and stating accounts.9
Early on, federal courts held that they had the authority to appoint special
masters through their "inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate
instruments required for the performance of their duties."" Courts pointed to
this inherent power as their authority to appoint special masters even over the
objections of the parties. Many courts held, however, that this inherent power
was bound by limitations imposed through Article III of the United States
Constitution 2 and determined that it was inappropriate to refer to the special
master matters that were determinative of a "fundamental issue of liability"
because the special masters do not meet the requirements imposed by Article
III. As a result, in the absence of the full consent of all of the parties, the most
widely accepted practice was to refer matters to the special master that were
narrow, well-defined, and specific.' 4

masters have been apart of the federal judiciary ofthe United States since its inception).
7. See, e.g., Holt Mfg. Co. v. C.L. Best Gas Traction Co., 245 F. 354, 357 (N.D.
Cal. 1917).
8. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Brading-Marshall Lumber Co. v. Wells, 203 F.
146, 148-49 (E.D. Tenn. 1913).
9. See, e.g., Thompson v. Smith, 23 F. Cas. 1092 (C.C. Ohio 1869).
10. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920); see also supra notes 131-43 and
accompanying text.
11. Peterson,253 U.S. at 312. According to the Peterson court:
This power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court
to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise
in the progress of a cause. From the commencement ofour government it has
been exercised by the federal courts, when sitting in equity, by appointing,
either with or without the consent of the parties, special masters....
Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1:
The judicial Power ofthe United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
13. See Stauble v. Warrob, 977 F.2d 690, 695-96 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing In re
Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1165, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Burlington
N. R.R. v. Dep't of Revenue, 934 F.2d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 1991)). The attributes most
commonly cited are lifetime tenure and the protection from the diminution of salary.
14. Where the parties have not consented, the courts traditionally treat the special
master's report as advisory, to be adopted by the court only to the extent that the court
agrees with it after making an independent review of the entire record. See, e.g., Heckers
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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B. Current Use of Special Masters
As a part of the 1938 enactment of the FRCP, Rule 53(b) specifically
authorized the appointment of special masters. 5 FRCP 53(b) was drafted to
follow the basic practices and guidelines of the earlier Equity Rules16 and to
clarify certain of those practices. Like the Equity Rules, FRCP 53(b)
contemplates specific and well-defined duties for the special master in the
federal court system. Although some courts have expanded the role of the
special master in a manner that has generated some controversy 7 and have
justified the appointment of special masters for controversial reasons, 8 there
remain some clear-cut and uncontroversial roles for special masters. These roles
involve duties, such as accounting and computation, determining relevant issues
under circumstances where the evidence is voluminous, 9 and advising the court
on severable issues that are highly technical in nature.2 ° The appointment of
special masters to perform these duties is seldom questioned by the parties,
courts, or commentators. These tasks and duties assigned to and performed by
special masters are generally held to be invaluable aids to the federal courts. In
complex litigation, where there are often hundreds, and sometimes thousands,

v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 131-33 (1864); Mastin v. Noble, 157 F. 506, 508 (8th
Cir. 1907); Holt Mfg. Co. v. C.L. Best Gas Traction Co., 245 F. 354, 356 (N.D. Cal.
1917); In re Thomas, 45 F. 784, 787 (D.C.S.C. 1891).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b).
16. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 42 U.S. (1
How.) xli-lxx (1842).
17. The use of special masters in pretrial management has been questioned by
many as an improper expansion of the traditional use of special masters because it
requires the exercise ofjudicial authority, which special masters do not have. See, e.g.,
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.14, at 16 (3d ed. 1982); Wayne D. Brazil,
Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a Source of Authority and
Restrictions?, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 143, 143-44(1983) [hereinafter Brazil, Referring
Discovery Tasks] (The author found that, although Rule 53 may not authorize the use of
special masters to perform pretrial management matters, courts still may appoint special
masters to perform these duties through their inherent authority.).
18. See LaBuy v. Howard Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 251-55 (1957). In LaBuy,
the Supreme Court indicated that under Rule 53, calendar congestion, complexity ofthe
issues, and the possibility of a lengthy trial were insufficient reasons to appoint a special
master whose duties were to carry out the full fact-finding function on the merits of the
case. Id. at 259. The Court determined that the use of the master in this manner
displaced the court rather than aiding it. Id.
19. See In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
20. See Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Bryant-Buckner Ass'n, 333 F.2d 202, 208-09
(4th Cir. 1964) (where a district court appointed an official in a tobacco association to
assist it in making judgments regarding tobacco marketing, a highly technical market).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/8
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of claims in a single case, special masters have been assigned to assist the court
in performing a variety of discrete functions. 2 In complex cases, district court
judges often appoint special masters to summarize and evaluate claims, and to
develop and implement case management and evaluation plans.'
Two
frequently cited, complex cases in which special masters were appointed to
evaluate claims and develop case management plans are the Alabama DDT
caseP and the Ohio asbestos case.24 In these cases, the special masters are
credited with developing innovative plans and data collection systems that
greatly aided the courts in streamlining the cases and bringing about their
resolution.'
The Alabama DDT and Ohio asbestos cases involved an
extraordinary amount of evidence and claims, and, for that reason, may be
viewed as unusual cases. But there are other complex litigation cases, without
the extraordinary volumes of evidence and claims found in the Alabama DDT
and the Ohio asbestos cases, in which special masters have been used quite
effectively. Special masters were appointed, in these more commonplace cases,

21. For athorough analysis of the use of special masters in complex litigation, see
Brazil, SpecialMasters, supranote 3, at 394. See also Francis E. McGovern, Toward
a FunctionalApproachforManaging Complex Litigation,53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 478-

91 (1986) (noting that special masters are used often in complex litigation to provide
expert, technical assistance, but, just as frequently, they are used to provide advice on
techniques for gathering and analyzing large amounts of empirical data).
22. To the extent that the special master's assigned duties include discovery
responsibilities, some have questioned the district court's authority under Rule 53 to
make such assignments to special masters. See generally Brazil, SpecialMasters,supra

note 3, at 395-98. Nevertheless, special masters are frequently appointed to supervise
discovery in complex cases. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Tumage,
115 F.R.D. 543, 558 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (special master appointed to resolve discovery
disputes where egregious discovery disputes found to exist); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 214 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (affirming the
appointment of a special master in a case involving voluminous technical and scientific
data); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 94 F.R.D. 173, 173-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)

(affirming the appointment ofa special master in a case involving more than four million
documents); United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 76 F.R.D. 97, 98-99 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Fisher v. Harris, Upham & Co., 61 F.R.D. 447,449-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
23. Wilhoite v. Olin Corp., No. CV-83-C-5021-NE (N.D. Ala. filed 1983); Hagood
v. Olin Corp., No. CV-83-C-5917-NE (N.D. Ala. filed 1983).
24. In re Related Asbestos Cases (N.D. Ohio filed 1983).
25. See, e.g., Jerome I. Braun, SpecialMastersin FederalCourt, 161 F.R.D. 211,
215-20 (1995); Margaret G. Farrell, The Role ofSpecial Masters in FederalLitigation,

C842 ALI-ABA 931, 946-51 (1993) [hereinafter Farrell, Role of Special Masters];
Jonathan S. Liebowitz, SpecialMasters: An Alternative Within the Court System, 48
Disp. RESOL. J. 64, 66-67 (1993).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 8
MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 67

to supervise discovery depositions, evaluate services, conduct surveys, receive
26
confidential and privileged documents, and review highly technical documents.
In recent years, judges and lawyers have given increased attention to active
judicial case management, including devices such as: pretrial scheduling, and
settlement conferences; discovery limits and deadlines; innovative methods of
hearing and disposing of motions; and case monitoring. Judicial intervention
through these case management devices reduces both the duration and expense
of litigation. Costs are reduced when judicial management causes settlement of
a case at an earlier stage of the process-thus eliminating the transaction costs
of motions and discovery that otherwise might have occurred. Costs and
duration are also reduced when pretrial conferences succeed in refining issues,
which, in turn, may reduce the number and extent of motions and discovery.27

26. See, e.g., In re U.S. Dep't of Def., 848 F.2d 232, 235-37 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(special master appointed to review sensitive government documents because the special
master already had security clearance and was an intelligence expert with the ability to
develop a sample of the documents and to summarize the reasonable positions that the
parties might take on the possible exemption of each document); In re Armco, Inc., 770
F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming the district court's appointment of the special
master to supervise and conduct pretrial matters, including discovery activity, the
production and arrangement of exhibits and stipulations of fact, and the power to hear
motions for summary judgment or dismissal); First Iowa Hydro Elec. Co-op. v. IowaIllinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613, 628 (8th Cir. 1957) (special masters appointed
to take discovery depositions that the court felt needed continuous supervision, and
externally imposed an order that a master could provide), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871
(1957); Costello v. Wainwright, 387 F. Supp. 324,327-28 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (In this class
action suit brought by Florida prisoners alleging constitutional deprivations caused by
inadequate health care provided in the prison system, the court appointed a special master
to aid the court in evaluating the quality of medical services provided to the inmates. The
special master assisted the court by "organizing, directing and conducting a
comprehensive survey of the health care services provided by the Florida Division of
Corrections to inmates committed to its custody, and to report his findings to the
Court."); TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Mancias, 877 S.W.2d 840,843 (Tex. App.
1994) (The appellate court affirmed a district court's appointment of a special master to
receive discovery documents that opposing counsel alleged to be confidential and
privileged by ruling that it was proper for the court to appoint a special master with
special training to assist in reviewing documents of such a technical nature to determine
questions of privilege and discoverability.); see also United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 216 (W.D. Mo. 1985); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 94 F.R.D. 173, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
27. See generally Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, Iowa, 710 F.2d 455, 463 (8th
Cir. 1983); MAUREEN SOLOMON & DOUGLAS SOMERLOT, TASK FORCE ON REDUCTION OF
LITIG. COST AND DELAY, JUD. ADMIN. DIVISION, A.B.A., CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN
THETRIALCOURT(1 987); MAUREEN SOLOMON& DOUGLAS SOMERLOT, LAW. CONF. TASK
FORCE ON REDUCTION OF LITIG. COST AND DELAY, A.B.A., DEFEATING DELAY:
DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A COURT DELAY REDUCTION PROGRAM (1986); Terry

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/8
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Special masters have come to represent an important element in the use of
these case management devices and in the overall search for ways of bringing
cases to ajust and acceptable end as quickly as possible. 28 Special masters have
been important to the courts, particularly in settlement discussions, because of
the more informal nature of the role of the special master." Courts also have
begun to appoint special masters with increasing frequency at the pretrial stage
to facilitate settlements by delegating some tasks to the special master to
minimize direct judicial involvement in settlement efforts early on and to avoid
the appearance of bias or prejudgment.3" Effective and efficient case
management requires flexibility.3" Lawyers and judges have come to accept that

Hackett, California Adopts New Case Management Rules to Reduce Delay, 75
JUDICATURE 108 (1991); Maureen Solomon & Holly Bakke, Case Differentiation: An
Approach to Individualized Case Management, 73 JUDICATURE 17 (1989); Hubert L.
ofLitigation,75 F.R.D. 117,125 (1978).
Will, JudicialResponsibilityfortheDisposition
25
(describing how special masters can
28. See generally Liebowitz, supranote
litigation). Federal courts also are
of
complex
length
the
in
controlling
assist the courts
increasingly turning to court-appointed managerial experts for assistance. Fora thorough
discussion of the courts' use of these experts and their authority to appoint them, see
generally Ellen E. Deason, Managingthe ManagerialExpert,1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 341.
29. See, e.g., Jerome I. Braun, SpecialMastersin FederalCourt, 161 F.R.D. 211,
218 (1995) (noting the role of the special master in facilitating settlement discussions,
advising the court, and evaluating the claims ofparties); Farrell, Role ofSpecialMasters,
supra note 25, at 946-49 (noting the role of the special master in discovery and
settlements, and as advisors, fact finders, and case managers); Liebowitz, supranote 25,
at 65 (reviewing a case in which a special master held eighty-five hearings in which 166
plaintiffs had claims against three defendants and in which the use of the special master
had a significant impact on the court's ability to conclude the case at all).
30. Judicial participation in the settlement process is the subject of much debate.
While some believe that judges can and should play a major role in helping parties
achieve settlement, others believe that the extent and nature of the judge's role in
settlement matters should be limited so that the judge can maintain neutrality and can
render a disinterested opinion should settlement discussions fail. See, e.g., DORIS MARIE
PROVINE, SETrLEMENT STRATEGIESFORFEDERALDISTRICrJUDGES 23 (1986) (discussing

disagreement among trial judges as to the proper involvement of thejudiciary in the use
of particular settlement techniques); E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the
Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 322-23 (1986) (reviewing and
discussing the change in emphasis from narrowing issues in the pretrial phase to
promoting settlement).
31. Increasingly, courts have found a variety of innovative ways in which special
masters can assist the court. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129
F.R.D. 434, 435 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) (special master appointed expressly to
achieve settlement of this complex case); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 94
F.R.D. 173, 173-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (The use of a special master to supervise discovery
and prepare the pretrial order was justified in light ofthe "sheer volume of documents to
be reviewed, the number of witnesses to be deposed, [and] the need for a speedy
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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differences in complexity and subject matter of lawsuits present the need for
different types of case management practices. The appointment of special
masters is one of the case management practices frequently employed by the
courts because it has proven to be particularly effective and efficient.
]II. POTENTIAL USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS IN BANKRUPTCY CASES
In bankruptcy cases requiring the estimation of claims, computation of
damages, valuation hearings, and, in cases ofcorporate debtors, highly technical
companies, the appointment of a special master could prove to be particularly
beneficial to the bankruptcy court. Often, a large, complex, corporate Chapter
1132 case with numerous claimants33 requires estimation of claims, computation
of damages, and valuation hearings. The bankruptcy court is required to
estimate any unliquidated or contingent claim, the "fixing or liquidation of which
'
..would unduly delay the closing of the case."34
Where there are numerous
claims of this type, a special master could be appointed by the bankruptcy court
to review the potential claims and to develop a method or propose a formula for
estimating the claims in question.35 Particularly in cases where the debtors are

processing of all discovery problems in order to meet the trial date"); Costello v.
Wainwright, 387 F. Supp. 324, 325-26 (D.C. Fla. 1973) (special master appointed to
evaluate the quality of medical services).
32. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2000). Chapter 11 is primarily designed for the
reorganization of the debts of a business through a reorganization plan. The plan must
be voted upon by specified creditors and shareholders, and must be confirmed by the
court.
33. Corporations and sole proprietorships filed 9,947 Chapter II cases in the
twelve-month period ending June 30, 2000. See Filings,Bankr. L. Daily (BNA) (Aug.
15, 2000) (reporting based on data released by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts); see also AlexanderD. Bono, ClassAction Proofs ofClaim in Bankruptcy,
96 CoM. L.J. 297,297 (1991) (noting the rise in class action issues arising in bankruptcy
cases).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (2000). For examples of situations in which the courts have
estimated claims in a Chapter 11 context, see In re Thomson McKinnon Securities,Inc.,
191 B.R. 976, 979-81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (estimation of claims involving trust
accounts and churning claims against the debtor); BeatriceCo. v. Rusty Jones, Inc., 153
B.R. 535, 536-37 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (estimation of contingent claims and validation of
liquidated claims in a Chapter 11 case).
35. At least one commentator has suggested that special masters could be helpful
to a bankruptcy court "when it must estimate the values of a large number of claims in
which the debtor has admitted liability. In these situations, special masters may obviate
the need for any oral hearing, [because] valuation of damages often involves more
concrete, objective factors than does evaluating liability." David Kauffman, Procedures
forEstimatingContingentor UnliquidatedClaims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 153,
170 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/8
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involved in highly technical areas, the appointment of a special master with
specific expertise could prove to be an invaluable service to the court and could
expedite matters considerably.
In In re White Motor Credit Corp.,36 the bankruptcy court, presiding over
a Chapter 11 case involving a corporation and five ofits affiliates in which there
were 160 products liability suits pending in state and federal courts across the
country, with the potential for the existence of many more unfiled suits,
proposed the appointment of a special master for just that purpose.37 The court
proposed appointing the special master to assist it in developing a program for
resolving the 160 pending product liability cases and for identifying and
resolving the potential unfiled product liability cases, and to "conduct hearings
on non-settled claims." 38 The court cited as reasons for the use of the special
master: (1) the amount of time that it was already spending on this case on a
daily basis; (2) the fact that travel to the residences of the parties and the
witnesses may be required; and (3) the inappropriate use of the court's time in
addressing what would be 'matters of account and... difficult computation of
damages."' 3 9 These are the same reasons why district courts appoint special
masters, and they are the same tasks that special masters appointed by the district
courts perform.' Ultimately, the bankruptcy court was unable to appoint a
special master in this case-not because the services of a special master were not
warranted-but due to jurisdictional issues.41
The only case in which a bankruptcy court successfully appointed a special
master is a case in a Puerto Rican bankruptcy court, which involved the
reorganization of a broadcasting company.42 Upon the petition of the creditors'
committee, the bankruptcy court appointed a special master for the express
purpose ofnegotiating and conducting the sale of two television stations. 43 The

36. 11 B.R. 294 (Bankr.N.D. Ohio 1981).

37. See id.at 296. The appointment of a special master to assist in the formulation
of a program to determine and resolve product liability claims was approved in this case,
but, on appeal, the court determined that the state courts where cases were initially
pending were the proper forums for resolving these cases and not the bankruptcy court.
In re White Motor Credit, 761 F.2d 270, 275 (6th Cir. 1985). The state courts were
deemed to be the proper forums because there were some defendants in the tort cases
who could not be transferred out ofthe jurisdiction, meaning that the cases would "have
to be tried twice in different courts" if the federal court heard some of the cases. Id. at
273-74. Thus, in the interest ofjustice and judicial economy, and because state issues
predominated, these cases remained in the state courts and were tried by state judges.
38. In re White, 11 B.R. at 295.
39. Id. at 297 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b)).
40. See supranotes 22-26 and accompanying text.
41. In re White, 761 F.2d at 271.
42. In re Am. Colonial Broad. Corp., 758 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1985).
43. Id. at 796.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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sale of this kind of asset requires special knowledge and expertise, and the court
saw the need for the assistance of an individual with special knowledge in this
area. The court did not give the special master the final decision in this matter;
rather, it retained the power to make the final decision regarding whether to
allow the sale to go forward, thus maintaining the special master's duty as a
specific, discrete one-not one that was case determinative." The order
appointing the special master was appealed by the losing bidder, the debtor, but
the appeal was unsuccessful because both the district court and the court of
appeals held that the order was not a final one-thus, it could not be appealed
unless an applicable exception existed (and the court of appeals held that no such
exception applied in this case).4" This case stands alone among reported
banlcruptcy cases in which a bankruptcy judge appointed a special master and in
which the special master actually performed the designated services.
In many districts, the most frequent need for a special master in a
bankruptcy case is in the self-employed, small-business Chapter 13 cases in
which there is reason to believe that greater assets and income exist than noted
in the schedules, but where the debtor's records are in a chaotic state, and require
extensive effort to track down and sort through to verify the accuracy of the
bankruptcy schedules. This assistance could be very helpful to the creditors and
to the court, but it would not be an efficient use of the court's time. The standing
Chapter 13 trustees47 are unable to devote the time that would be required to
fulfill this task because of the sheer volume of Chapter 13 cases in many
districts.48 As a result, the potential benefit to creditors, in many of these cases,
would merit the appointment of a special master.
In Chapter 11 cases, there are frequent motions to modify the automatic
stay 9 in which the court must determine the value of the property at the center
of the controversy in order to decide if the automatic stay should be modified.
44. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
45. In ream. Colonial,758 F.2d at 798-803.

46. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2000). This Chapter, as its title suggests, is designed
to provide for the "Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income." Debtors
propose a payment plan generally of a three-to-five-year duration, which must be
confirmed by the court, and, in return, the debtors receive a discharge from most
remaining debts upon completion of the plan.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) (1994). These statutes

permit the appointment of a person to serve as the trustee in the Chapter 13 cases filed
in a particular region when the number filed in the region warrants the full-time attention
of a single trustee. Many districts have the services of a standing trustee, and some

districts with extremely large Chapter 13 filings have the services of more than one
standing trustee.
48. See Filings,supranote 33 (For the twelve-month period ending June 30,2000,
there were 380,770 Chapter 13 cases filed.).

49. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
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Often, both the creditor and the debtor present appraisals of the property, but the
court must reach an independent decision as to the actual value of the property
for purposes of deciding whether the creditor's motion to modify the automatic
stay should be granted. Also, in Chapter 11 cases, the court must determine
whether the plan of reorganization is feasible." Whether the plan is feasible or
not depends, in large part, on financial information regarding the debtor and
whether the data demonstrate, inter alia,that the debtor's capital structure and
earning power are adequate to support the plan of reorganization."' Creditors
who object to the plan of reorganization may present data to dispute the debtor's
projections. The court must analyze all of the information in order to make an
independent determination regarding the feasibility ofthe plan of reorganization.
In both instances, a special master could provide valuable assistance to the court
in analyzing the various appraisals and financial data provided by the debtor and

creditors.
Among the multitude of bankruptcy cases filed annually, s2 there are many
cases that require specific and easily delineated tasks, such as the estimation of
claims, 3 computation of damages, and analysis and assessment of appraisals and

50. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(1 1) (2000).
51. See, e.g., In re Merrimack Valley Oil Co., 32 B.R. 485, 488-91 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1983); In re Landmark at Plaza Park Ltd., 7 B.R. 653, 658-60 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1980).
52. See Filings,supranote 33. In the twelve-month period ending June 30,2000,
there were 1,276,922 bankruptcy petitions filed; in the twelve-month period ending June
30, 1999, 1,352,030 petitions were filed.
53. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 57(d), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed
1979), not all claims were required to be estimated. Section 57(d) of the Act provided
that if the estimation of a contingent or unliquidated claim would unduly delay the
administration of the estate or any proceeding under this Act, the claim would not be
allowed. The result was that the creditor's claim would be unaffected by the discharge
in bankruptcy, and the creditor could pursue the debtor after the claim was fixed or
liquidated despite the debtor's discharge. Section 502(c) of the Code requires the
estimation of contingent or unliquidated claims when the fixing or liquidation of those
claims would unduly delay the administration of the case. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
502.04[l], at 502-51 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2001). Congress wanted'"to
afford the debtor complete bankruptcy relief," and § 502(c) was one means that Congress
used to achieve this goal. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 352 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6308. Section 502(c)'s estimation of the claims requirement adds
to the number of claims in which the court directly must involve itself by taking evidence
to determine the proper estimation. Where a claim is fixed, liquidated, and welldocumented, the claim is automatically allowed without a review by the court, unless a
party in interest objects to the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (2000).
In the reorganization under Chapter 11 of one chemical company, the potential
existed for the individual estimation of 187 contingent and unliquidated claims against
the debtor. In re Borne Chem. Co., 16 B.R. 509, 512 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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financial data. These kinds of tasks make the appointment of a special master
a practical and desirable addition to the tools available to assist the district court
and bankruptcy judge in bankruptcy cases. Moreover, these tasks involve the
kind of services that masters historically have performed.'4
IV. SPECIAL MASTERS PROHIBITED IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Source of the Prohibition
Although there are many kinds of proceedings in which a bankruptcy court
may benefit from the services of a special master, bankruptcy courts are not
authorized to appoint special masters at this time. Because of a bankruptcy rule
that expressly prohibits the appointment of a special master in bankruptcy cases,
special masters may not be appointed by bankruptcy judges.5" The Bankruptcy
Code provides no statutory prohibition against the appointment of special
masters; the only prohibition against the appointment of a special master in
bankruptcy cases is set forth in a procedural rule that states: "Masters Not
Authorized: Rule 53 F.R.Civ.P. does not apply in cases under the Code." 6
This procedural rule, Bankruptcy Rule 9031, is a single, simple sentence
providing neither guidance nor elucidation."7 A Committee Note, also a single,
simple sentence, follows the rule, stating: "Committee Note: This rule
precludes the appointment of masters in cases and proceedings under the
Code.""s The note only adds the word "proceedings" to the word "cases" in its
"discussion" of the Bankruptcy Rule that makes FRCP 53 of the FRCP
inapplicable under the Code.59 This single-sentence rule and the lack of a true
explanation or discussion in the Committee Note calls into question the authority
of even the district court to appoint a special master in a bankruptcy case.' The
rule is not limited in its application to bankruptcy cases that are before the

54. 1 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 6.6(1), at 133 (noting that masters traditionally
performed specific tasks associated with taking evidence).
55. FED. R. BANKR. P. 903 1.
56. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9031. In contrast, the Bankruptcy Code expressly prohibits
bankruptcy judges from appointing receivers in bankruptcy cases. 11 U.S.C. § 105(b)
(2000).
57. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9031.
58. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9031.
59. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9031.
60. See supranotes 56-58 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/8
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bankruptcy court.6' Rather, it is apparently applicable to all courts hearing a
bankruptcy case, including the district court.62
The only other published and official explanation for Rule 9031 comes
from the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules' preface to the thenproposed Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in which the Committee provided
discussion of each of the proposed rules.63 In its discussion of proposed Rule
9031, the Advisory Committee reviewed former Bankruptcy Rule 513, ' which
made FRCP 53 applicable in bankruptcy cases, and explained: "There does not
appear to be any need for the appointment of special masters in bankruptcy cases

61. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 provides: "The Bankruptcy Rules and Forms govern
procedure in cases under title 11 of the United States Code.... These rules shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and
proceeding." Should the United States district court withdraw the reference of a
bankruptcy case or proceeding from the bankruptcy court, the district court judge would
be prohibited from appointing a special master in the bankruptcy case or proceeding
because of Rule 9031, despite the fact that the case or proceeding is one in which the
appointment of a special master greatly would assist the court in "secur[ing] the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of [the] case." Id.
62. See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatizationof Justice
Through ADR, I1 OHIO ST. J.ON DISP. RESOL. 241,271 ('The propriety of appointing
special masters in bankruptcy cases is subject to some dispute. This consideration led
the author to use a semantic substitute-the court-appointed 'special advisor'-in the
Manville Bankruptcy-Trust litigation." (footnotes omitted)). Mark Peterson, the special
advisor to the court in In re Joint E. & S.Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 573
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1995), af'd, 100 F.3d 944 (2nd Cir. 1996), the case referred to
by Judge Weinstein, was appointed to develop a plan for restructuring the trust payment
schedule and refinancing the trust, and to evaluate the claims by the type of disease.
These are duties traditionally assigned to special masters. See alsoMinerex Erdoel, Inc.
v. Sina, Inc., 838 F.2d 781,783 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,488 U.S. 817 (1988); In re
Elcona Homes Corp., 810 F.2d 136, 140 (7th Cir.1987) (Both cases support the
proposition that district courts may not allow the appointment of a special master in a
bankruptcy case through their reference powers.).
63. [A] COLLIER ON BANKRUpTCY app. pt. 2(b), at 2-120 to 2-124 (Lawrence P.
King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2001).
64. FED. R. BANKR. P. 513, titled SpecialMasters, provided: "if a reference is
made in a bankruptcy case by a judge to a special master, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure applicable to masters apply." FED. R. BANKR. P. 513 (repealed Aug. 1, 1983),
reprintedin 12 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, at 5-103 (James Win. Moore & Lawrence P.
King eds., 14th ed. 1978). COLLIERONBANKRUPTCY explains: "The word 'judge' meant
the United States district judge, not the bankruptcy judge." [A] COLLIER ON
BANKRUPr6Y app. pt. 2(b), at 2-122 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2001).
Accordingly, former Rule 513 generally applied only when a Chapter X case was
retained by the district judge although it probably would apply when a district judge
removed any case from the bankruptcy court to the district court. See FED. R. BANKR.
P. 102(b) (repealed Aug. 1, 1983).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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by bankruptcy judges. The Advisory Committee, therefore, has decided that
former Rule 513 not be continued in the rules and that Rule 53 F. R. Civ. P. not
be made applicable."6
The Advisory Committee has given no further
explanation for its decision that there no longer would be a need for the
appointment of special masters in bankruptcy cases." Given the language of
Rule 903 1,67 making FRCP 53 inapplicable in all bankruptcy cases, no judge,
whether of the district court or bankruptcy court, is authorized to appoint a
special master. This kind of prohibition did not extend to district court judges
under the Bankruptcy Act." It is difficult to believe that this was the intended
result of the rule, but it is the necessary result when the clear and unambiguous
language of the rule is applied as written.
B. Evolution of the Bankruptcy Rules
Having a grasp of the history of the Bankruptcy Rules is helpful in
understanding the absence of a more complete discussion in the Committee
Notes69 and in understanding the Committee's failure to recognize that the rule
is broad enough to prevent district court judges from exercising what has come
to be considered by many as an inherent power. 0 The concept of having a
formal, separately published set of rules to govern procedure in the bankruptcy
courts is a relatively recent one.7 Until 1976, when the final rules of the initial
set of procedural rules were promulgated by the Supreme Court and became
effective,72 the Bankruptcy Act of 1898"3 contained all ofthe procedural, as well

65. [A] COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. pt. 2(b), at 2-122 (Lawrence P. King ed.,
15th ed. rev. 2001).
66. One commentator has suggested that Rule 53 was made inapplicable to
bankruptcy cases through Rule 9031 because of "the expense of special masters in
bankruptcy, and... 'public perceptions of cronyism."' Kauffman, supranote 35, at 171
n.82. Rule 53 has been construed as requiring the parties' consent. Where the creditors
and the court agree that the special masters can preform certain tasks more efficiently, the
creditors agree to bear that expense. The bankruptcy estate would not bear the cost. The
expense ofthe special master should not be a concern because it would be incurred only
if the parties consent.
67. See supranotes 56-58 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
69. See supranotes 58-59 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
71. See generally Lawrence P. King, The History and Development of the
Bankruptcy Rules, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 217 (1996) (discussing in great detail the history
and process of bankruptcy rulemaking).
72. See Bankruptcy Rules & Official Forms, 425 U.S. 1003 (1975); Bankruptcy
Rules & Official Bankruptcy Forms, 411 U.S. 989,991 (1972); King, supra note 71, at
220 (describing the decision to draft and promulgate the rules in parts, so that the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/8
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as the substantive provisions, of bankruptcy law.74 Prior to that time, experience
in drafting separate procedural rules for bankruptcy was extremely limited.75
In 1964, Congress granted bankruptcy rulemaking authority to the Supreme

Court.76 For the first time, it was possible to draft a complete set of rules to

provide for all procedural matters that may arise in bankruptcy cases. The
Advisory Committee charged with drafting the rules decided to approach this
awesome task chapter by chapter.7 As draft rules were completed by the
Committee, they were disseminated to the bench and bar for comment. Finally,
in April of 1976, after many years of tedious and faithful work by the
78
Committee, the final set of rules were promulgated.
The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code,79 with its extensive changes to the
bankruptcy laws, made revisions to the rules an absolute necessity. The Code
was enacted in 1978 with an effective date of October 1, 1979, but it was not
until January 1, 1979, that a new Advisory Committee began its work on the new
set of rules. This gave the Advisory Committee a mere nine months to draft a
new set of rules to complement extensively modified bankruptcy laws. Even
with the existence of a model to follow, nine months was a very short time when

effective dates of the first set of rules are different for different parts of the package of
rules).
73. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
74. See King, supra note 71, at 217 ("At least seventy percent of the Bankruptcy
Act, if not more, was procedural.").
75. See King, supranote 71, at 217-18. An Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules was appointed in 1960 by the Chief Justice as Chair of the Judicial Conference of
the United States to study the bankruptcy procedural rules contained in the General
Orders in Bankruptcy and Official Forms and to recommend amendments. These
committee members gained experience with drafting proposed rules, although the scope
of their review was quite limited.
76. The statute read as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure under the Bankruptcy Act. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right. Such rules shall not take effect until they
have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning
of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day ofMay and until the
expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported. All laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect.
Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 88-623, § 1, 78 Stat. 1001 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
2075 (1994)).
77. King, supranote 71, at 224.
78. See Bankruptcy Rules and Official Bankruptcy Forms, 425 U.S. 1003 (1975).
79. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000) (as enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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compared to the twelve years that the first Advisory Committee took to draft the
initial set of rules.8" In light of this short time period, the Advisory Committee
decided that the best course of action was to draft a set of interim rules.8' The
sole goal of the Advisory Committee in drafting the interim rules was to fill the
gaps between the new Code and the existing rules; this goal was completed in
August of 1979.82 These interim rules were adopted as local rules and were used
between the effective date of the new Code and the promulgation of the
replacement rules. No effort was made at that point to make a detailed study of
the existing rules to determine which rules required modification or deletion in
light of the broader range of cases that the bankruptcy court could hear under the
Code.
The Advisory Committee then began its work on the permanent set ofrules.
During the time that the Committee was taking comments on the interim rules,
the United States Supreme Court decided a landmark case, Northern Pipeline
ConstructionCo. v. MarathonPipeLine Co. 3 The far-reaching implications of
this case caused concern among members of the bankruptcy bar and bench, who
promptly turned their attention to it. No changes were made to the proposed
permanent rules as a direct result of this case because the Committee did not
think that the rules contained anything that pertained to jurisdiction and because
it was hoped that proposed legislation would resolve the entire issue." If the
Committee had reviewed its work on the rules in light of the NorthernPipeline
decision before sending them on to the Judicial Conference and the Supreme
Court, it is possible that matters, like the appointment of special masters, might
have been discussed more thoroughly and different decisions might have been
made.

80. King, supra note 71, at 220-33.
81. See King, supra note 71, at 237.
82. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., PRELIMINARY
DRAFr OF PROPOSED NEW BANKRUPTCY RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS, xix (1982).

83. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In this case, a Chapter 11 debtor filed suit in the
bankruptcy court against Marathon for damages based on a breach of contract and
warranty, as well as misrepresentation, coercion, and duress. Id. at 56. Under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, this kind of action would have been outside of the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court, and the proper place to bring the action would have been the
state court. The Bankruptcy Code had broadened thejurisdiction ofthe bankruptcy court
so that it had jurisdiction to hear this kind of claim-one that was not directly a part of
the bankruptcy matter. Id. at 54-55. The Supreme Court held that this broadened
jurisdiction unconstitutionally vested the bankruptcy judges with "judicial power"
without granting them the protection of Article III status. Id. at 87.
84. H.R. 6978, 97th Cong. (2d Sess. 1982) (reintroduced in the 98th Congress as
H.R. 3, 98th Cong. (1983)). Granting bankruptcy judges Article III status would have
done much toward resolving the jurisdictional issue.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/8
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C. Evolution of the Bankruptcy Court
A discussion of the role and status of the bankruptcy judge under the
Bankruptcy Act provides some background against which the prohibition against
special masters in bankruptcy cases under the Code can be better understood.
This is helpful in understanding why the Committee thought that there would be
no need to make FRCP 53 applicable under the Code.
Until 1973 under the Bankruptcy Act, the person who presided over
bankruptcy cases held the position of "referee in bankruptcy."' 5 The "referee in
bankruptcy" had limited jurisdiction over most bankruptcy cases. In ChapterX
corporate reorganizations, the jurisdiction of the "referee in bankruptcy" was so
limited that the "referee" served only as a special master to hear and report
generally or upon specified matters to the district court judge.86 When the
"referee" acted in a Chapter X case, former Bankruptcy Rule 513 applied to
make FRCP 53 applicable in those instances, rendering the "referee in
bankruptcy" a special master appointed by the district court.87 Under the
Chandler Act of 1938,88 the duties and workload of the "referee in bankruptcy"
increased tremendously, but the jurisdiction of the court was still limited. In
1973, the title "referee inbankruptcy" was changed to "United States bankruptcy
judge" due, in part, to recognition of the increased duties required of this

85. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 8 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,

5969.
86. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 117, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed
1978); see, e.g., Faucher v. Lopez, 411 F.2d 992,995 (9th Cir. 1969) (The district court
appointed the bankruptcy referee as special master to decide issues of fraud in the
bankruptcy case.).
87. FED. R. BANKR. P. 513 (repealed Aug. 1, 1983), reprintedin 12 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, at 5-103 (James Wm. Moore & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th ed. 1978)
("If a reference is made in a bankruptcy case by ajudge to a special master, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to masters apply."); see also 12 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 513.6, at 5-106 (James Wm. Moore & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th ed.
1978) (discussing the district court judge's retention of jurisdiction in Chapter X
corporate reorganization proceedings and that judge's reference of a proceeding under
Chapter X to a referee in bankruptcy acting as a special master). The court in United
States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 293 (W.D. La. 1963), described the role of the
bankruptcy referee:
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a district court to
appoint a 'standing' master for its district or a 'special master'. As used in
[the] rules the word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner.
Rule 53.... A Referee in Bankruptcy has even more power than a master:
he may render a binding judgment.
88. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 60e, 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (repealed 1979).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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position. 9 Nevertheless, the new bankruptcy judges still did not have any
greater jurisdiction than before.
In 1978, Congress enacted dramatically new bankruptcy legislation, which
created and conferred on the bankruptcy courts very broad jurisdiction." One
of Congress's goals in reforming the bankruptcy laws was to create more
efficient procedures for administering bankruptcies. To achieve this goal,
Congress chose to vest broad powers and jurisdiction directly in the bankruptcy
courts. 9' Even before Congress had an opportunity to enact permanent
Bankruptcy Rules to accompany its newly enacted Bankruptcy Code,92 its efforts
were very quickly and successfully challenged in the landmark Northern
Pipeline case.93 The Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline held that the
jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 were unconstitutional
primarily because the Code had vested Article III94judicial power in non-Article
III judges-judges who lacked lifetime tenure and protection against salary
diminution.95 Under the Bankruptcy Code, Congress granted to the bankruptcy
courts all of the usual powers of the district courts, including the power to hear
jury trials and to issue final judgments that were binding and enforceable in the
absence of an appeal.96 The Supreme Court held that this grant ofjudicial power
without a grant of Article III status was unconstitutional as a violation of the
separation ofpowers.97 After the NorthernPipelinedecision, Congress enacted
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code to address the jurisdictional issues raised
by the case.98 In the 1984 Amendments, Congress gave federal district courts

89. FED. R. BANKR. P. 901(7) (repealed Aug. 1, 1983); see Joseph C. Zavatt, The
Use of Masters in Aid of the Court in Interlocutory Proceedings, 22 F.R.D. 283, 285
(1958) ("Over the years since the Act of 1898, [the powers of referees in bankruptcy]
(subject to review) have been extended.., to the point where (since 1938) they have the
power to grant or deny discharges-a power formerly reserved to the District Court

Judge sitting as a bankruptcy court.").
90. See supranote 76.
91. See generally Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the
United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. REv. 5 (1995).
92. Bankruptcy Rules, 461 U.S. 973 (1982) (Permanent rules for the 1978
Bankruptcy Code were not promulgated until 1983.).

93. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
94. See supranote 12.
95. Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 63.

96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (This Section was added by Act ofNov. 6, 1978, Pub.
L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2668 (1978), but did not become effective pursuant to § 402(b) of
such Act.).
97. Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 85.
98. Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 378 (1984). The
amendments to the Code to address the issues in Northern Pipeline took a considerable
period oftime, during which bankruptcy cases were in limbo. The obvious solution was
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/8

18

20021

Delk: Delk: Special Masters in Bankruptcy:
SPECIAL MASTERS INBANKRUPTCY

exclusive jurisdiction "over all cases under title 11" and nonexclusive
jurisdiction "of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related
to cases under title 11 ." The district courts have exclusive jurisdiction, under

to make the bankruptcy judges Article HI judges, but this had been rejected during the
enactment process oftheReform Act and continued to be opposed. In a later amendment
to the Bankruptcy Code, however, Congress created a Bankruptcy Review Commission,
which recommended Article HI status for bankruptcy judges to increase the efficiency
of the bankruptcy process. The Commission pointed to the costs caused by the Article
I status ofbankruptcy judges, including those primarily associated with the necessity of
drawing jurisdictional lines between core and non-core proceedings, and those caused
by the constitutional uncertainty over the definition of core proceedings. NAT'LBANKR.
REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXTTWENTY YEARS § 3.1, at 718,722-24,732-35,
737-39 (1997). Both before and after this recommendation, many commentators
advocated Article I status for bankruptcy judges. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, The
Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 529, 544-46
(1998) (pointing to the costs caused by dividing bankruptcy jurisdiction between the
district and bankruptcy courts, including the delays caused by the division, and the
doctrinal and constitutional uncertainty caused, and advocating Article m status for
bankruptcy judges); Christopher F. Carlton, Greasingthe Squeaky Wheels of Justice:
Designingthe Bankruptcy Courtsofthe Twenty-FirstCentury, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 37,4546 (1999). In his article, Mr. Carlton examined several proposals to amend the
Bankruptcy Code and recommended Article I status for bankruptcyjudges. He quoted
the legislative history of the Reform Act of 1978's discussion of granting Article MI
status to bankruptcy judges:
[T]he Constitution suggests that an independent bankruptcy court must be
created under Article III. Article I is the constitutional norm, and the limited
circumstances in which the courts have permitted departure from the
requirements of Article III are not present in the bankruptcy context. Even if
they were present, the text of the Constitution and the case law indicate that
a court created without regard to Article III most likely could not exercise the
power needed by a bankruptcy court to carry out its proper functions ....
Congress should establish the proposed bankruptcy court under Article II,
with all of the protection that the Framers intended for an independent
judiciary.
Carlton, supra, at 45 n.55 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-598, at 390 (1978), reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6000). But see generally Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy
Judges Need Not andShould Not Be Article IIIJudges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567 (1998)
(citing historical and constitutional policy reasons why Article I status is desirable for
bankruptcy judges).
Granting Article H status to bankruptcy judges, however, would not resolve the
problem of the appointment of special masters in bankruptcy. Rule 9031 prohibits the
appointment of special masters in any bankruptcy case, whether before an Article I
judge or not. See supranote 61-62 and accompanying text.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b) (1994) (granting district courts original and exclusive
jurisdiction over"all cases undertitle 11," and original butnot exclusivejurisdiction over
"all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title
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the 1984 Amendments, over all property of the bankruptcy estate wherever it is
located."°
Through these amendments, Congress chose to give broader
jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters to the district courts. Congress dealt with
the status of the bankruptcy judges by declaring that they constitute a "unit" of
the district court called the bankruptcy court.' 0' The district courts may refer all
bankruptcy cases and proceedings within their jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts, 2 but, under the 1984 Amendments, the proceedings are divided into
"core" and "non-core" matters with bankruptcy judges being permitted to "hear
and determine" the matter and enter final judgment only in the "core"
proceedings. 103 During and after the time that NorthernPipelinewas making its

11"). "Case" refers to the procedure followed in the administration of the debtor's estate
and "proceeding" refers to the disputes occurring during the bankruptcy case. See 1
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3.01[1][c][i]-[ii], at 3-20 to 3-27 (Lawrence P. King ed.,
15th ed. rev. 2001).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1994).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). Section 151, "Designation of bankruptcy
courts," states:
In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service shall
constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for
that district. Each bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the district court,
may exercise the authority conferred under this chapter with respect to any
action, suit, or proceeding and may preside alone and hold a regular or special
session of the court, except as otherwise provided by law or by rule or order
of the district court.
28 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994). Section 157(a) states that: "Each district court
may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under
title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy
judges for the district." 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1994). Dividing the bankruptcy proceedings into
"core" and "non-core" proceedings permitted Congress to allow bankruptcy judges to
hear bankruptcy cases while maintaining Article I status without running afoul of
Marathon. In its opinion in Northern Pipeline,the Court recognized an exception to the
separation of powers that permitted Congress to set up legislative courts in specialized
areas like bankruptcy where the adjudication of a "public right" is involved. The "core'
matters involve issues directly related to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor
relationship, the "public right;" these matters may be heard by the bankruptcy judge
subject only to appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), there are
circumstances under which bankruptcy judges may hear "non-core" proceedings:
A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but
that is otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the
bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by
the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings
and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/8
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way to the Supreme Court, bankruptcy courts were operating under the rules
adopted under the Bankruptcy Act and interim rules designed to fill the gaps
between the Bankruptcy Code and the original rules under the Act."° ' The first
permanent rules were being drafted for the new Bankruptcy Code at the same
time as amendments were being made to the Code to address the Northern
Pipelinejurisdictional issues.' These jurisdictional issues also needed to be
addressed in the rules. It may have been the haste and comfusion of the day that
led to the unexplained conclusion that special masters could not be appointed in
bankruptcy cases."° Whatever the reason, what resulted was Rule 9031 with its
inadequately explained prohibition against the appointment of special masters
in bankruptcy cases. 7 A court's inability to use as important a case
management device as special masters hinges on Rule 9031, arule with virtually
no explanation or justification-and one that appears to have been drafted in
haste, without significant consideration given to its significant impact.
V. No COMPARABLE ROLE EXISTS
Special masters are appointed by the court to assist in cases where the issues
are complicated and where exceptional conditions exist, or in matters ofaccount
and where there are difficult damages computations.'0 ° The special master is
appointed to assist the court in cases in which the court deems help necessary to

has timely and specifically objected.
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994).
104. Committee on Rules ofPracticeandProcedureofthe JudicialConference of
the United States, in [A] COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY app. pt. 2(b), at 2-116 to 2-119
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2001).
105. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
106. See generally[A] COLLIERONBANKRUPTCY app. pt. 2(b), at2-122 (Lawrence
P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2001).
107. The possibility exists that the Committee Notes were drafted with the former
practice of having bankruptcy referees act as special masters in Chapter X cases under
the former Bankruptcy Act in mind. At least onejudge has suggested that Rule 9031 was
drafted with this former practice in mind. See In re S.Portland Shipyard & Marine Rys.
Corp., 32 B.R. 1012, 1020 n.9 (D. Me. 1983). The In re S. Portlandcourt stated:
Rule 9031 was enacted because the new Code, if left intact, would have made
the reference of bankruptcy cases superfluous .... The new Code was not left
intact, however; ... Rule 9031, which specifically addressed the situation in
which all bankruptcy cases are to be heard by Bankruptcy Judges in the first
instance, is incongruous in the situation created by Northern Pipeline
whereby the District Court is to exercise bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Id. at 1021 n.10. The Committee never may have contemplated bankruptcy judges
appointing special masters in bankruptcy cases.
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)-(b).
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further the administration of justice." 9 The role of the special master is to
represent the court in carrying out specified duties, as directed by the appointing
court. The Bankruptcy Code does not provide for the appointment of a person
in a comparable position. The Bankruptcy Code does provide for the
appointment of trustees and examiners." 0 In fact, the Code mandates that, under
certain circumstances, the court must appoint examiners and trustees after a
request to do so"' is made by a party in interest" 2 or the United States Trustee." 3

109. See Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (Justice Brandeis, referring
to the role of the special master, stated that he or she is an "instrument for the
administration ofjustice [to be employed by the court] when deemed by it essential.");
United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272,293 (W.D. La. 1963) (noting that the special
master is charged with the same obligations of a judicial officer).
110. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1104, 1106, 1202, 1302 (2000) (explaining the duties of
a trustee in a Chapter 7 case, the appointment of a trustee or examiner in a Chapter 11
case, the duties of a trustee and examiner, and the duties of trustee in a Chapter 12 case,
respectively). For an excellent discussion of the role of the examiner and a comparison
of that role to that of the trustee, see Leonard L. Gumport, The BankruptcyExaminer,20
CAL. BANKR. J. 71 (1992).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000) provides in relevant part:
(a) At any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation
of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States Trustee, and
after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross
mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management,
either before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause,
but not including the number of holders of securities of the debtor or the
amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor; or
(2) if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity
security holders, and other interests of the estate, without regard to the
number of holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or
liabilities of the debtor....
(c) If the court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section,
then at any time before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in
interest or the United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court
shall order the appointment of an examiner to conduct such an investigation
of the debtor as is appropriate, including an investigation of any allegations
of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or
irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor of or by curent or
former management of the debtor, if
(1) such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security
holders, and other interests of the estate; or
(2) the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for
goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000.
112. No definition for the term "party in interest" is provided in the Bankruptcy
Code. Some guidance is provided in 11 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). The Legislative Statement
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/8
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When they are appointed, trustees and examiners represent the bankruptcy estate,
have very broad duties, and are required to perform comprehensive acts for the
benefit of the entire estate,"' such as accounting for property received,

provides that: "[r]ules of bankruptcy procedure or court decisions will determine who
is a party in interest for the particular purposes of the provision in question... ." 11
U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
113. 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589 (1994) (These provisions describe the United States
Trustee system, which was designed, in large part, to perform and oversee the
administration of bankruptcy cases.).
114. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2000) provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he trustee in a
case under this title is the representative of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000)
provides, in relevant part:
A trustee shall(1) perform the duties of a trustee specified in sections 704(2), 704(5),
704(7), 704(8), and 704(9) of this title;
(2) if the debtor has not done so, file the list, schedule, and statement
required under section 521(1) of this title;
(3) except to the extent that the court orders otherwise, investigate the
acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition ofthe debtor, the
operation ofthe debtor's business and the desirability ofthe continuance
of such business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the
formulation of a plan;
(4) as soon as practicable(A) file a statement of any investigation conducted under
paragraph (3) of this subsection, including any fact ascertained
pertaining to fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct,
mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the affairs
of the debtor, or to a cause of action available to the estate; and
(B) transmit a copy or a summary of any such statement to any
creditors' committee or equity securityholders' committee, to any
indenture trustee, and to such other entity as the court designates
(b) An examiner appointed under section 1104(d) of this title shall perform
the duties specified in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a) ofthis section,
and, except to the extent that the court orders otherwise, any other duties of
the trustee that the court orders the debtor in possession not to perform.
11 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) provides:
The trustee shall(1) collect and reduce to money the property ofthe estate for which such
trustee serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible
with the best interests of parties in interest;
(2) be accountable for all property received;
(3) ensure that the debtor shall perform his intention as specified in
section 521(2)(B) of this title;
(4) investigate the financial affairs of the debtor;
(5) if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object
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examining proofs of claims, furnishing information concerning the estate to
parties in interest who have made requests, filing periodic reports of the
operation of the business with taxing authorities, and making final reports to the
court on the administration of the estate.I 's
In contrast, the special master is appointed by the court to represent the
court by performing narrow, well-delineated tasks." 6 District courts order the
special master to perform these well-delineated tasks in a very limited manner
and for a specific proceeding within a case-not for the entire case." 7 Special
masters have a different mission, different loyalties, and different supervisors
than do trustees and examiners. Trustees and examiners are not authorized under
the Code to perform the vast majority of tasks that a court would need and
appoint a special master to perform."'
It is the general goal of all courts to conserve judicial resources and to
enhance the efficiency of the court with regard to its case management. ' 9 Even
as "units" of the district court,' 20 bankruptcy courts share this same goal.
Trustees and examiners, however, cannot help the bankruptcy courts in reaching
this goal of conserving judicial resources and enhancing the efficiency of the
courts with regard to case management. In Section 1104, where the Code
provides for the appointment of trustees and examiners, there is nothing within

to the allowance of any claim that is improper;
(6) if advisable, oppose the discharge of the debtor;
(7) unless the court orders otherwise, furnish such information
concerning the estate and the estate's administration as is requested by
a party in interest;
(8) if the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated, file with
the court, with the United States trustee, and with any governmental unit
charged with responsibility for collection or determination of any tax
arising out of such operation, periodic reports and summaries of the
operation of such business, including a statement of receipts and
disbursements, and such other information as the United States trustee
or the court requires; and
(9) make a final report and file a final account of the administration of
the estate with the court and with the United States trustee.
115. I1U.S.C. § 704 (2), (7), (8), (9) (2000).
116. See supranotes 14, 21-31, and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. In fact, it is when courts have
appointed a special master to perform tasks that amount to full and complete fact-finding
in the case that courts find the appointment improper as a substitute for the judicial role.
118. Compare the duties ofthe trustee and examiner under 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106,
1202, 1302 (2000), with the powers of the special master under FED. R. Civ. P. 53. See
also supranotes 15-31 and accompanying text.
119. See supranotes 27-28 and accompanying text.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
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the outlined duties that would reflect the goal of providing assistance to the
court.'2 ' There are alternate standards provided for the appointment of trustees
and examiners, 2 2 and the trustee and the examiner have different duties;
however, the appointment ofthese individuals is not designed to assist the courts
in the management of the case.
The trustee's duties are to protect the debtor's assets for its creditors and
equity security holders.' 2 ' The trustee has broad powers to carry out this goal,
including ousting the debtor's current management and operating the business
directly. The examiner is appointed to conduct an investigation of the debtor.2
The Code appears to contemplate that what the examiner will investigate is
improper conduct by, toward, or involving the debtor.' 2 ' The goal of the
investigation by the examiner is directed at providing information about the
feasibility and wisdom of the continued operation of the Chapter 11 debtor's
business. The goal does not appear to be directed at the courts' management of
the case as much as it is at the protection of the Chapter 11 debtor's creditors and
equity security holders.'
The examiner's investigation may provide
information that ultimately effects the management of the cases; however, it is
not the management of the case itself that the examiner's appointment is
designed to effect.
Traditionally, special masters have been appointed in complicated two-party
and class-action litigation. 27 In bankruptcy cases, particularly in proceedings
brought to determine the dischargeability of debts 21 in complex commercial
cases, problems related to the computation of damages maybe quite complicated
and may involve voluminous documents and repeated disputes among different
claimants regarding quite similar matters, in much the same way as in two-party
and class-action litigation. Although trustees and examiners may be appointed
by the bankruptcy court,2 9 the duties ofthe trustee and examiner as described in
the Code 3 ° do not include providing case management assistance to the court in
litigation matters like the discharge of debts, one of the very areas where
complicated matters of account or computation are most likely to occur. Inthese

121. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), (c) (2000).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(c), 1106(a)(3)-(4), (b) (2000).
11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000).
11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000).
See, e.g., Brazil, SpecialMasters,supra note 3.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)-(16) (2000).

129. Examiners only maybe appointed in Chapter 11 cases. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 103,
901 (2000).
130. See supranote 110 and accompanying text.
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matters, the bankruptcy court is not authorized to appoint an individual with the
expertise to assist the court in expediting these matters.
VI. INHERENT AUTHORITY OF COURTS OF EQUITY
The authority of courts to control and direct the business of the court in the
interest of the sound and efficient administration of justice flows from the very
nature of a judicial body and requires no grant of power other than that which
creates the court and gives it jurisdiction. In fact, much of what courts must do
in the conduct of their business is not provided for in any rule or statute and
necessarily relies on inherent authority. The court's inherent authority to direct
its business in the interest of the efficient administration of justice provides
courts with significant leeway in conducting the business of the court. This
inherent authority is well established and widely accepted in the federal
judiciary. 3 '
The historical development of the courts' authority to appoint special
masters began in English courts of equity.'32 In this country, former Equity Rule
68, "Appointment and Compensation of Master," and former Equity Rule 59,
"Reference to Master-Exception, Not Usual," provided the first statutory basis
for the appointment of special masters; FRCP 53 developed as a modification of
those rules. 3 3 Courts and commentators have emphasized thatbeyond FRCP 53,
courts of equity have the inherent power to appoint special masters.'
While

131. See, e.g., Veneri v. Draper, 22 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1927) ('There can be no
question, we think, that under the federal practice the judge has the power in a proper
case to refer a cause to an auditor for the purpose of simplifying the issues and thereby
enabling the court and thejury to more readily determine the matters in dispute."); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210,217-21 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (citing and
reviewing numerous cases in which special masters were appointed to assist the court in
various ways); Jordan v. Wolke, 75 F.R.D. 696, 701 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (appointing a
special master pursuant to its inherent authority); Farrell, Coping with Scientific
Evidence, supra note 3, at 943-44; Jacob, supra note 3, at 34.
132. See supratext accompanying notes 4-5.
133. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 42 U.S. (1
How.) xli-lxx (1842).
134. See, e.g., Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) ("Courts have...
inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the
performance of their duties. This power includes authority to appoint persons
unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties,
as they may arise in the progress of a cause."); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th
Cir. 1982) (The federal courts' equitable power to appoint special masters to supervise
implementation of decrees long has been established.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042
(1983); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir. 1956) ("Beyond the
provisions ofRule 53, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., for appointing and
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some commentators have suggested that FRCP 53 is not applicable to pretrial
phases of a civil lawsuit, they have observed that federal courts may have the
power to appoint a special master in pretrial matters under their inherent
35
authority.
The fact that the federal courts' inherent authority to appoint special masters
existed prior to FRCP 53 has been throughly researched and discussed by Wayne
D. Brazil.'3 6 He noted that "the Advisory Committee's intent in drafting Rule
53 was to preserve the essentials of the system of referencing as it existed under
the Federal Equity Rules between 1912 and 1938."' 3 The "essentials of the
system," as they relate to the duties of the special master, included appointing
special masters to assist the courts by gathering and analyzing relevant data from
complex financial records and making recommendations to the court, to aid in
computing damages and in providing other well-defined assistance on specific,
38
narrow issues.
This is exactly the kind of assistance that bankruptcy courts
need-assistance in performing very specific and well-focused tasks.'39
Bankruptcy courts are recognized as courts of equity,"4 and, as such, they have
the inherent authority to appoint special masters to perform these same specific,
narrow, well-defined tasks that special masters were appointed to perform by

making references to Masters, a Federal District Court has 'the inherent power to supply
itselfwith this instrument for the administration ofjustice when deemed by it essential."'
(quoting Peterson,253 U.S. at 312)); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Bringle, 86 F.2d 262,
263 (6th Cir. 1936); Jordan v. Wolke, 75 F.R.D. 696, 701 (E.D. Wis. 1977) ("This
appointment [of a special master] is made pursuant to the court's general equity powers
and not under Rule 53, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Conn. Importing Co. v.
Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225, 226 (D. Conn. 1940) ("The power of the
court so to proceed [to appoint a special master] is beyond question. It exists
independent ofthe rule. Rule 53 serves but to outline the procedure to be followed when
the power is exercised."); Thompson v. Smith, 23 F. Cas. 1092, 1093 (C.C. Ohio 1869)
("[A]cted under the authority of a well-established principle, that the courts ofthe United
States, in the exercise of their chancery powers, possess an inherent authority, in proper
cases, to order a reference to a master."); Kaufman, supra note 5, at 462 ("There has
always existed in the federal courts an inherent authority to appoint masters....").
135. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.14, at 16 (3d ed.
1982); Brazil, ReferringDiscovery Tasks, supra note 17, at 143.
136. Brazil, ReferringDiscovery Tasks, supra note 17, at 149-60.
137. Brazil, ReferringDiscovery Tasks, supranote 17, at 149 (citing statements
of Robert G. Dodge, a member of the original Advisory Committee, and Edgar B.
Tolman, the secretary of the Advisory Committee on the rules for civil procedure).
138. Brazil, ReferringDiscovery Tasks, supranote 17, at 155.
139. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
140. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974); Bank of Marin v. England,
385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
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courts of equity prior to the enactment of FRCP 53. Bankruptcy courts have not
relied upon this inherent authority to appoint special masters presumably because
of the existence of Rule 9031. "
The only current prohibition against the appointment of a special master in
bankruptcy is this procedural rule. There is no statutory provision within the
Bankruptcy Code that prohibits the appointment of special masters. The Code
expressly prohibits the appointment of receivers 42 through a specific statutory

141. Significant controversy exists regarding the relationship between written
procedural rules and inherent judicial authority, and the extent to which procedural rules
can and should limit courts' inherent authority over their process and procedure. The fact
that a procedural rule addresses specific issues does not necessarily mean that a court
successfully cannot assert its inherent authority to allow it to deal with those same issues.
Courts sometimes find that the rules can be interpreted so that pre-existing inherent
authority simply supplements the rules. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.
32,46 (1991); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-33 (1962) (holding that FED. R.
CIV.P. 41 (b) authorizing dismissals on the motion of the defendant did not deprive courts
of their inherent authority to dismiss without such a motion). The Court in Chambers
rejected the argument that the sanction provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. §
1927 restrict the court's inherent authority, and stated:
We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and
the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith
conduct [in this case]. These other mechanisms, taken alone or together, are
not substitutes for the inherent power, for that power is both broader and
narrower than other means of imposing sanctions.
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46. But see Brooks Fashion Stores v. Mich. Employment Sec.
Comm'n, 124 B.R. 436, 440 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) ('The Bankruptcy Rules were
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to authority granted by Congress in 28
U.S.C. § 2075. As such, the Rules have the force of law."); John Papachristo, Comment,
Inherent Power Found, Rule 11 Lost: Taking a Short Cut to Impose Sanctions in
Chambers v. NASCO, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1225, 1250-65 (1993) (arguing that the rules
should be construed generally to pre-empt inherent authority).
Bankruptcy judges have not appointed special masters routinely pursuant to the
inherent equitable powers granted the bankruptcy court under Bankruptcy Code § 105(a):
"[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000). Although § 105
serves as the depository of the bankruptcy court's inherent equitable powers, vesting the
court with the power to issue orders necessary to carry out the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy judges apparently have felt constrained by Rule 9031.
142. 11 U.S.C. § 105(b) (2000) ("Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section,
a court may not appoint a receiver in a case under this title."). Under the former Act, the
bankruptcy judge had the power to appoint receivers in bankruptcy cases, but the
Bankruptcy Code replaced the role of the receiver in bankruptcy with the interim trustee.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, there no longer was a need to appoint the receiver as under
the former law. See generallyBENJAMIN WEINTRAUB &ALANN. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY
LAW MANUAL 6.02, at 6-4 to 6-7 (3d ed. 1992).
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provision. If the drafters had specific and strong reasons why special masters
should not be appointed in bankruptcy cases, it is likely that they would have
drafted an express statutory provision, as opposed to a procedural rule, as they
did regarding receivers. 43 However, the drafters failed to do so.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are many reasons to permit bankruptcy courts to benefit from the
unique services of special masters in the unusually complex bankruptcy case or
proceeding-chief among them is an interest in the sound and efficient
administration ofjustice. There are very few sound reasons to deny bankruptcy
courts the benefit of special masters. In fact, Rule 9031, which is the sole
prohibition against the appointment of special masters in bankruptcy cases, cites
no reason at all for denying courts the benefit of this well-accepted case
management device.
Many authorities have concluded that no express statutory basis is required
for courts of equity to appoint a special master.'" These authorities hold that
courts of equity have inherent power and authority to do that which is necessary
to carry out their duties, including appointing persons unconnected with the case
to assist the courts in performing their duties. 45
The effect of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9031 is to deny both
the district court and the bankruptcy court the right to appoint a special master
in appropriate cases. In denying these courts the power to appoint special
masters in bankruptcy cases, Rule 9031 abridges the inherent power of both the
district court and the bankruptcy court to act as courts of equity by employing
a traditional tool available to a court of equity.'" But, more significantly, it
deprives debtors and creditors of the opportunity to benefit from this traditional
judicial resource.
Congress expressly has authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for
the Bankruptcy Court.'47 However, in authorizing the Court to prescribe these
rules, Congress provided that: "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge, ormodify
any substantive right."' 48 The inherent power of courts to appoint special
masters is a long-standing and well-accepted substantive right that, arguably, has
been impermissibly abridged by this procedural rule. A procedural rule should

143. 11 U.S.C. § 105(b) (2000).
144. See supranotes 131-38 and accompanying text.
145. See supranotes 131-38 and accompanying text.
146. See supranotes 131-38 and accompanying text.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1994) ("The Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure in cases under Title 11.").
148. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1994).
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not function in a way that, even arguably, modifies an inherent right of the
court. 49 Rule 9031 should be abrogated, and a new rule that would permit the

appointment of special masters in bankruptcy cases consistent with the
substantive rights of a court of equity should be promulgated.

149. See In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1971) ("[N]o rule of court can
enlarge or restrictjurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law.").
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